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SELECTED SIGNIFICANT INCOME TAX
DEVELOPMENTS IN 1965
LEo A. DIAMOND
Attorney, New York, N. Y.
Member of the firm of Austin & Diamond
During the year 1965 there has been no significant increase or decrease,
as compared to prior years, in the number of judicial or administrative
developments in the federal income tax field. In the legislative area it
was "quiet", there being no income tax legislation actually enacted. As
in other years most of the court decisions and administrative rulings were
run of the mill, involving familiar situations and concepts. But, as in
other years too, there were legislative activities, court decisions, and ad-
ministrative rulings which are of more than routine interest, deserving
of special attention. It is from such activities, decisions and rulings that
the selection has been made in this paper for discussion.'
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Although there were no income tax statutes enacted 2 there was con-
siderable legislative activity affecting the entire federal tax structure.
The major enactments were the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965,8
Social Security Amendments of 1965, 4 Railroad Retirement Tax Act
Amendments of 1965, 5 and Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of
1965,6 each of substantial significance. 7
Interestingly enough significant legislative activity in the income tax
field consists of one enacted statute (dealing with enrollment, inter alia,
of taxpayers' representatives before the Treasury Department)8 and
1. The selection of significant tax developments is in large measure subjectively
determined. Those discussed in this paper, are, of course, not claimed to be all-
inclusive. See, e.g. Emory & Goldstein, "Federal Income Taxation", 1965 Annual
Survey of American Law 209
2. Neither was there any estate or gift tax legislation.
3. P.L. 89-44, 79 Stat. 136.
4. P.L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286.
5. P.L. 89-212, 79 Stat. 858.
6. P.L. 89-243, 79 Stat. 954.
7. Although these four acts are of large importance, they are, of course, outside
the scope of this paper.
8. P.L. 89-332, 79 Stat. 1281, terminating the special enrollment of attorneys at
law and certified public accountants to represent taxpayers before the Treasury
Department. See TIR-781, November 23, 1965, announcing interim procedures
under P.L. 89-332. As to attorneys at law and certified public accountants, those
already enrolled to practice may continue to represent taxpayers before the In-
ternal Revenue Service and those not so enrolled may represent a taxpayer by
filing a declaration that they are in good standing as lawyers or certified public
accountants, as the case may be. The Act has no application to persons other than
attorneys at law and certified public accountants and does not abolish the power
of attorney requirement.
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three proposals. The first proposal is designed to encourage more for-
eign9 investment in the United States by easing some of the existing tax
burdens on nonresident aliens, foreign corporations, and estates of non-
resident aliens. The second,1" introduced at the request of the American
Bar Association for study, contains a potpourri of proposed miscellaneous
income, estate and gift tax amendments (substantive and procedural)
which span a wide gamut. The third'1 is a study by a Congressional
Committee suggesting the legislative reversal of Rev. Rul. 64-22412 which
permitted deduction of amounts paid in satisfaction of treble damage
claims under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. As of this writing none of the
foregoing proposals have been translated into actual legislation.'
Lastly, during 1965 Senator Harry F. Byrd, Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee retired from Congress, his post being taken over by
Senator Long of Louisiana, who has been, and presumably will continue
to be, more favorably inclined toward the Treasury views on tax legis-
lation than his predecessor, Senator Byrd. This change in committee
leadership conceivably can be of substantial significance in the make-up
of the tax laws during the next several years.
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Supreme Court
During 1965 there was a flurry of activity in the Supreme Court,
unusual in that there were nine important federal tax decisions-twice
the number usually handed down at a term. In United States v. First
National City Bank14 the Court upheld an injunction issued by a District
court in New York City to enjoin the First National City Bank of New
York City from transferring any funds owing to Omar, S.A., a Uruguayan
corporation (alleged to owe federal income tax) whether such funds were
in the United States or in a branch of the bank in Montevideo, Uruguay,
pending trial on the merits of the tax claim. This decision, over a vig-
orous dissent by Justices Harlan and Goldberg, expanded the concept of
9. H.R. 11297 (89th Cong. 1st Sess.), Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1965, re-
introduced as H.R. 13103, Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966.
10. H.R. 11450 (89th Cong. 1st Sess.).
11. Study by Staff of Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation of Income
Tax Treatment of Treble Damage Payments under Antitrust Laws (November 1,
1965).
12. C.B. 1964-2, 52.
13. See, however, H.R. 12752 (89th Cong. 2d Sess.) Tax Adjustment Bill of
1966 which is scheduled for enactment.
14. 379 U.S. 378, 85 S. Ct. 528. See also United States v. Speers, 86 S. Ct.
411, holding that a federal tax lien unrecorded as of the time of bankruptcy was
invalid as against trustee in bankruptcy.
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how far a District Court can "freeze" property under its control, whether
such property be within or without the United States-an expansion
which presumably the Treasury will not be slow to exploit in the enforce-
ment of collection of taxes.
The Supreme Court also had occasion to pass on the scope of the
"lesser offense" defense in a criminal tax proceeding; 15 the taxability
as ordinary income of gains realized by purchasers of notes (originally
issued at discount) on sale of such notes prior to maturity; 16 depreciation
basis of steamships purchased from the Government; 17 taxable invest-
ment income on life insurance companies;18 statute of limitations on tax
evasion charges;' 9 and coal depletion.
20
In April, 1965, the Supreme Court upheld, by a 6 to 3 vote, capital
gain treatment in a boot-strap operation involving the sale of property
to charity with a lease-back to the sellers. 2' Brown and others owned
substantially all the stock in a corporation which owned and operated
sawmills and related lumber activities. In 1952 they agreed to sell their
stock to a charity for $1,300,000 with a $5,000 down payment, the bal-
ance to be spread over ten years payable out of earnings. It was agreed
that contemporaneously with the stock transfer the charity would liqui-
date the company and lease its assets for five years to a new corporation
(formed and wholly owned by Brown and others) which was to pay to the
charity 80% of its operating profit (without depreciation or taxes) and
90% of such payment would then be paid over by the charity to Brown
and others. The charity had no personal obligation to pay the note except
from rental income. Brown was to have a management contract with the
new corporation and the right to name any successor managers. Two
years later Brown resigned as general manager and in 1957 the new
corporation terminated its operations after suffering severe financial
reverses. Brown and his group did not repossess the property under their
mortgage but agreed that the property should be sold by the charity
with the latter retaining 10% of the proceeds. The property was sold
15. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 85 S. Ct. 1004.
16. United States v. Midland-Ross Corporation, 381 U.S. 54, 85 S. Ct. 1308;
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 85 S. Ct. 1301, which in effect laid at rest
Caulkins v. Comm., 1 T.C. 656, acq. CB 1944, p.5, aff'd 144 F. 2d 482 (CA 6,
1944), acq. withdrawn CB 1955-1, 7. In the Dixon case the taxpayer's claim that
he relied on Caulkins fell on deaf ears.
17. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 85 S. Ct. 1389.
18. United States v. Atlas Life Insurance Company, 381 U.S. 233, 85 S. Ct.
1379.
19. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 85 S. Ct. 1365.
20. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624, 85 S. Ct. 1207.
21. Commissioner v. Clay Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 85 S. Ct. 1162.
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by the charity for $300,000. Brown and his group received $900,000 on
the $1,300,000 note. The Supreme Court upheld Brown's contention that
this transaction gave rise to capital gain and not ordinary income---but
not without vigorous dissent by three Justices.
The Clay Brown decision has precipitated not inconsiderable com-
ment 22 and has provoked the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Tax-
ation, in conjunction with the Treasury Department, to study that de-
cision with the view to developing "corrective legislative proposals". 2 3
It is not likely that, in view of the Congressional study, there will be
many persons rushing to set up boot-strap transactions similar to the
one utilized in the Brown case. Too much success in one case often means
no more "success" for others prospectively.
In an estate tax case2 4 the Supreme Court held that airplane flight in-
surance purchased "on the spur" at an airport was includible in the gross
estate of the applicant where three hours later the applicant perished
in the crash of the airplane on the flight covered by the flight insurance
purchased at the counter. The Court held that the proceeds of the ac-
cidental death policy were "insurance proceeds" and that the decedent
had not completely divested himself of ownership even though his wife
was beneficiary, she had paid the premiums, and he had told the counter
clerk to give the policies "to my wife. They are hers now, I no longer
have anything to do with them." The importance of the decision is that
counter flight insurance is no different from life or other accidental death
insurance for estate tax purposes, but that the applicant could divest
22. E.g., O'Neill, "Sales of Business to Charities-The Brown Case and its
Aftermath," 43 TAXES 507 (1965); see also, Oliver, "Income Tax Aspects of
Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property," 51 Cornell L. Q. 21 (1965). Dauber,
Jewell and Hall, Comment on Brown case, 23 Journal of Taxation, 2 (1965);
Eliasberg, "Boot-strap Sales," 23 Journal of Taxation, 42 (1965).
23. Press Release by Chairman Wilbur D. Mills of the Committee on Ways and
Means, October, 1965. 657 CCH Par. 6743. After setting forth the possible scope
of the Brown decision, the release ended with the following caveat. "Because of the
seriousness of the problem presented, the staffs have been requested to consider the
desirability of recommending that any corrective legislative proposals in this area
relating to arrangements with exempt organizations or, possibly, loss corporations
in situations which are similar or analogous to that involved in the Brown case,
be made effective as of the date of this announcement." (Italics supplied).
The majority of the Supreme Court apparently was satisfied that there was an
arm's-length transaction and that the property was sold to the charity for an
amount not in excess of fair market value. The decision presumably would have
been otherwise had the property been sold in excess of fair market value. But
how much of an excess? Despite the reasoning of the Court's opinion, the decision,
justifiably enough, does require corrective legislation at least for the future.
24. Commissioner v. Noel Estate, 380 U.S. 678, 85 S. Ct. 1238. See Maxfield,
"Federal Estate and Gift Taxation." 1965 Annual Survey of American Laws 195.
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himself of all ownership (which he did not do in the Noel case) so as to
have the proceeds excluded from the gross estate.2 5
For a number of years a troublesome problem of depreciation has
vexed taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service, namely, whether, in
the year of sale of real estate a substantial profit, depreciation for that
year is allowable as a deduction. In November 1965, the Supreme Court
heard argument in the Fribourg case on taxpayer's appeal from a denial
of straight-line depreciation for the year of sale of ships sold at a large
profit.iia On March 7, 1966 the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, re-
versed the lower court and upheld the deduction of depreciation in the
year of sale.25 b For all practical purposes, therefore, the attack of the
Internal Revenue Service on such last-year depreciation in the case of
real estate has come to an unsuccessful end. 25C
Courts of Appeal
In contradistinction to the Supreme Court, the various Courts of Ap-
pea 26 have many more issues to decide which decisions, because of the
fortuitousness of what cases are heard by the Supreme Court, become the
"law of the land". During 1965 that profuseness of issues was not
abated.
Out of the welter of several hundred decisions rendered by the Courts
of Appeal27 two dozen or more have been selected for notice.
In Van Zandt v. Commissioner2 8 the taxpayer (a doctor) had created
two trusts for his children, acting as trustee. He conveyed his office
property to the trust with a lease-back to himself and paid rent which he
deducted on his own return. He was denied the deduction because under
the lease-back he had retained the reversion; he was merely shifting
funds from one pocket to another. Yet in Oakes29 rental payments could
25. Although the Noel decision involves only estate tax, the opinion does touch
upon Congressional approval of administrative interpretation also applicable to
income tax.
25a. Fribourg Navigation Co., Inc. v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1964) 335 F. 2d
15. At the time this paper was originally presented to the Tax Conference the Su-
preme Court had not rendered its decision.
25b. 86 S. Ct. 862 (1966).
25c. Motor Lease v. U.S. 86 S. Ct. 1076 (1966) involving sale of automobiles.
26. In Choate v. Commissioner (CCA 2, 1942) 129 F. 2d 684, 689, Judge Frank
described a Court of Appeal as "merely a reflector serving as a judicial moon . .. ,
guided by the light of Supreme Court decisions" but added that "perhaps the
figure [of speech] indicates too much abjectness. On occasions, sometimes un-
wittingly, lower courts in tax cases manifest some creativeness."
27. For present purposes District Court decisions have not been generally in-
cluded.
28. (CA 5, 1965), 341 F. 2d 440, aff'g. 40 TC 824, cert. den. 86 S. Ct. 32.
29. 44 TC No. 48 (1965). See, Note 41 N.Y.L. Rev. 206 (1966).
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be deducted under somewhat different circumstances. Dr. Oakes and his
wife owned improved real estate on which he had his office. Some three
years after acquisition of the property he created an eleven-year trust
for his minor children and named a bank as trustee. He conveyed the
property to the trust with a lease-back for reasonable rent. Two years
later he assigned his future interest to his wife and named her as
guardian. The rental payments after the assignment were held deductible
ostensibly because of the independent trustee and of the assignment of
the reversionary interest. Van Zandt was distinguished on those grounds.
Where the dividing line-the undulating equator-is between Van Zandt
and Oakes is not as simple as appears.
The Spomars ° and Kohatsu31 cases stand as important warnings to
taxpayers that an investigating revenue agent is under no legal duty to
inform a taxpayer (not yet charged with any tax crime) that he has a
constitutional right to refuse to answer questions or produce records.
Hence evidence voluntarily produced or made available by a taxpayer
under investigation is admissible against him, whether or not he was in-
formed or knew of his constitutional right. These decisions highlight the
advisability of having professional assistance even at the earliest stages of
revenue agent audits in appropriate cases.
A troublesome question in the area of income tax deductions is that
relating to payments which are made in violation or some public policy
(local or national) or the deductibility of which would be against public
policy implicit in federal tax law. 3 2 The outstanding decision in 1965 is
Telliers1 which upheld a deduction for legal expenses incurred by tax-
payer, a securities underwriter, in unsuccessfully defending against crim-
inal fraud charges. The Court of Appeals, in a landmark decision, re-
versed its distinctions established more than thirty years ago. 4 In March,
30. United States v. Spomar (CA 7, 1965), 339 F. 2d 941.
31. Kohatsu v. United States (CA 9, 1965), 351 F. 2d 808.
32. See, United Draperies, Inc. v. Comm. (CA 8, 1965) 340 F. 2d 936, cert.
den., 382 U.S. 813; 86 S. Ct. 30 holding that gifts or rebates to employees of good
customers were not deductible as business expenses and Dukehart-Hughes Tractor
Co. v. U. S. (Ct. Cl. 1965) 341 F. 2d 613, holding that "gifts" to Iowa state em-
ployees were deductible. Also, deductions were allowed in Sterling Distributors v.
Paterson (D. C. Ala., 1965) 236 F. Supp. 479 for rebates or free beer given in
violation of Alabama statutes and in Marigold Foods, Inc. v. United States (D. C.
Minn. 1965) 65-2 USTC Par. 9667 for depreciation on dairy property operating
in violation of state law. Tyler, "Disallowance of Deductions on Public Policy
Grounds" 20 Tax L. Rev. 665 (1965).
33. Tellier v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1965) 342 F. 2d 690.
34. The distinction was that deduction would be allowed for legal or related
expenses incurred in successfully defending a criminal charge incident to the opera-
tion of a business but no deduction where the defense was unsuccessful. Burroughs
Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner (CCA 2, 1931) 47 F. 2d 178.
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1966 the Supreme Court affirmed. 35 The concept or role of public policy
in tax controversies has now taken on a new aspect.
It has been customary for the Internal Revenue Service to wield a big
stick where the funds of a close corporation are used for the personal
benefit of a principal stockholder. The corporation is not allowed any
deduction and the stockholder is deemed to have received a dividend or
ordinary income to the full amount. In DiZenzos6 it was held that where
the government claimed corporate expenditures were dividends, the Court
held that if that be the claim then the amount of earnings or profits is of
vital importance in determining how much of the expenditure is a divi-
dend under Section 316 of the Code, taxable as ordinary income. This
decision is an important limitation on the big stick treatment.
The issuance of advance rulings by the Internal Revenue Service has
not infrequently raised the issue of the extent to which such rulings can
be relied upon by persons similarly situated or closely related to the re-
cipient of a ruling. In Bornstein3 7 the taxpayer could not sustain an
estoppel against the Commissioner on the ground that he relied on a
ruling given to another related person similarly situated in a "collapsible
corporation" transaction. Many a tax plan can founder on misplaced
reliance on rulings given others inasmuch as no one knows just when the
Internal Revenue Service may choose to abandon a position taken in any
given type of ruling.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held in two cases that
a divorce may be considered as valid for federal income tax purposes in
determining taxability of alimony even though such divorce was not valid
under the law of New York in which the parties were resident.3 8 These de-
cisions, if not overturned, 3 9 will be a mixed blessing tax-wise to persons
participating in "quickie" divorces, depending upon whether the issue is
taxability or deductibility of alimony payments.
35. 86 S. Ct. 1118. Compare Knetsch v. United States (Ct. Cl., 1965) 348 F.
(2d) 932, cert. den. 86 S. Ct. 1221, disallowing deductions for out-of-pocket costs
incurred in tax-saving annuity purchase plans which went "sour" taxwise with
Perry A. Nichols 43 TC 842 which permitted theft loss deduction for amounts paid
to promoters of abortive tax-saving scheme! See also DeCastro, "Liberal Trend in
Allowing Deductions for Legal Fees" 20 Tax L.R. 615 (1965); Krane, "Deducti-
bility of Legal and Accounting Fees". 44 TAXES 7 (1966).
36. DiZenzo v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1965) 348 F. (2d) 122. See Teschner,
"Hidden Dividends-Paper Tiger of Constructive Corporate Distribution" 43
TAXES 644 (1965).
37. Alfred B. Bornstein v. United States (Ct. Cl., 1965 345 F. (2d) 558.
38. Borax v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1965) 349 F. 2d) 666, involving a Mexican
divorce; Wondsel v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1965) 350 F. (2d) 339, involving a
Florida divorce.
39. Certiorari has been denied in both cases, 86 S. Ct .... (1966). In the Borax
case there was also the issue as to whether a second marriage would be recognized
supporting the validity of a joint return filed by the taxpayer and second wife.
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Regulations of the Commissioner prescribing actuarial tables for valu-
ing future or present interest are generally sustained for income, estate or
gift tax purposes. In extraordinary situations, however, it is open to tax-
payers to claim and sustain valuations based on actual facts. Thus, in
Hall Estate4 ° a reversionary interest for estate tax purposes was valued
not on the basis of mortality tables, but on the actual physical condition
of the decedent. In every case where the taxpayer seeks to avoid the use
of the tables in the regulations, the burden is upon him to justify such
avoidance.
For many years the Internal Revenue Service maintained an almost
inflexible view that a taxpayer could validly elect the installment method
of reporting gain only in the first possible income tax return when it was
filed. This view has been materially shaken by two decisions4 which per-
mitted the taxpayer in each instance to claim and obtain the benefit of
the installment method at a later time when what he did or did not do
at the time of filing the initial return was not inconsistent with an election
to use the installment method. The Internal Revenue Service has an-
nounced that it will revise its regulations governing the election of the
installment method for reporting gain,4 2 thus abandoning its heretofore
strict view of the validity of an election to use the installment method.
Other interesting decisions involved nondeductiblity of loss on sales
between related persons in a family corporation4 8 , tax effects of reincor-
poration under Sections 337, 331, and 368(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code,44 duty of an attorney to disclose identity of person making a
deposit on account of taxes, 45 taxability of excess value on gift of ma-
turing endowment policy to charity,4 6 nature of gain on sale of contract
40. William S. Hall, et al. v. United States (CA 7, 1965)-F. (2d)-, 65-2
USTC Par. 12,359; 16 AFTR (2d) 6206. See also Estate of J. Tucker v. United
States (D.C. Tex. 1965)-F. Supp.-, 65-2 USTC Par. 12, 360, 16 AFTR (2d)
6199, for a similar departure from use of actuarial tables in valuing claim of di-
vorced wife.
41. Mamula v. Commissioner (CA 9, 1965) 346 F. (2d) 1016 and Bookwalter
v. Mayer (CA 8, 1965) 345 F. (2d) 476. In Mamula the taxpayer, in good faith,
originally elected a method which was clearly nonallowable. In the Mayer case,
the taxpayer, in good faith, did not report the sale in the year it was made because
no payment was received in that year; later in a timely amended return for that
year, the taxpayer claimed the installment method which claim was sustained by
the Court of Appeals.
42. In TIR 756, 657 CCH Std. Fed. Tax Rep. Par. 6700 the Internal Revenue
Service announced that pending issuance of revised regulations it would follow the
Mayer and a number of other cases decided in 1962, 1963 and 1964 liberalizing the
election of the installment method. See also F. E. McGillick 42 TC 1059 (1965)
43. McCarthy v. Conley (CA 2, 1965) 341 F. (2d) 948.
44. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner (CA 4, 1965) 345 F. (2d) 35.
45. Tillotson v. Boughner (CA 7, 1965) 350 F. (2d) 663; Schulze v. Rayunec
(CA 7, 1965) 350 F. (2d) 666.
46. Friedman v. Commissioner (CA 6, 1965) 346 F. (2d) 506.
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rights including release of employment claims,4 7 loss of good will and
effect of expectation of recovery on year in which loss is deductible,4" spin-
offs, 9 necessity for definiteness in a deficiency notice under Section 269 of
the Code," ° and disallowance of depreciation for television network con-
tracts.' Oa
Tax Court
Some of the perennial troublesome tax problems incident to transfers
of business from one corporate entity to another were given an airing in
Hyman N. Berghash5 1 . The taxpayer was sole owner of X Corporation
stock engaged in the drug business. X sold certain of its operating assets
to Y Corporation, the stock of which was owned equally by taxpayer and
an unrelated investor. X was then liquidated and dissolved. The Tax
Court held there was no reorganization either under Section 368(a) (1)-
(D) or (F) of the Code; distributions to taxpayer did not constitute divi-
dends and the gain realized by X was not taxable because of Section 337.
In Ralph Bellamy5 2 an attempted capital gain transaction on the sale
of rights in television films was held to result in ordinary income. 53
The Tax Court considers 54 husband and wife who have filed a joint
income tax return as separate taxpayers for purposes of sending out de-
ficiency notice so that the Commissioner can either send a joint notice or
separate notices. Thus, if the husband and wife are separated, the Com-
missioner is not precluded from accepting a waiver of restrictions from
one spouse and sending a statutory notice of deficiency to the other.
The prolonged continuation of an estate can have some surprising tax
effects. In Old Virginia Brick Co. 5  an estate was kept in existence long
beyond the time it had a raison d'etre for being continued. The Tax
Court held the executors were in fact trustees under a testamentary trust
so that an election they made as stockholders of the taxpayer corporation
to treat it as a Sub-chapter S corporation was invalid!
In Hitchon Estate56 the principal stockholder of a family corporation
47. Turzillo v. Commissioner (CA 9, 1965) 346 F. (2d) 884.
48. Parmelee Transportation Co. v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1965) 351 F. (2d)
619.
49. Lockwood v. Commissioner (CA 8, 1965) 350 F. (2d) 712.
50. Luke v. Commissioner (CA 7, 1965) 351 F. (2d) 568.
50a. Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp. (CA 7, 1965) 350 F. (2d)
580, cert. den. 86 S. Ct. 645.
51. 43 TC 743. See also Frank Verito, 43 TC 429 and Guy A. VanHeusden 44
TC 491.
52. 43 TC 487.
53. Cf. Commissioner v. Ferrer (CA 2) 304 F. (2d) 125.
54. Marie A. Dolan 44 TC 420.
55. 44 TC-# 69.
56. 45 TC-#6
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turned in nearly all of his stock to the corporation, receiving nothing in
return. The other stockholders were his sons. Sometime after the trans-
fer the corporation was liquidated. In determining the gain realized by
the sons, the Tax Court held that although the gift was ostensibly to
the corporation, the father actually made a gift to each of his sons so
that the basis of stock originally owned by the sons should be increased
by the transferor's basis of the stock turned in to the corporation. A
most interesting dichotomy of form and substance!
How to arrive at the value of property for tax purposes has been and
still is somewhat of a puzzle. In Phillip Kaplan5 7, Daniel McGuire5 ', and
Maurice Rivkin59, the Tax Court had to wrestle with what constitutes
fair market value as affected by auction sale results6". The opinions in the
Kaplan and McGuire cases make for hilarious reading-a welcome res-
pite from so many dull performances in tax opinions.
ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In Rev. Rul. 65-3061 the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that even
though a corporation which is eligible to avail itself of the tax benefits
under Section 337 fails to furnish the information required under the
Regulations, the stockholders will not ipso facto be denied their benefits
under such section.
In three revenue rulings6 2 the Service has set forth several examples
of what do or do not constitute "rents" under Section 1372(e) (5) of the
Code for Subchapter S purposes. The examples include (a) short-term
leasing of motor vehicles, leasing of barricades during construction of
motor carts, of dress suits, of construction crane, and (b) storage charges
for grain, cotton, and refrigerated products.
A significant pronouncement appears in Rev. Rul. 65-19263 concerning
the guides to be followed in valuing closely held corporate stock for in-
come, estate and gift tax purposes. In setting forth these guides the Serv-
ice has explicitly stated that the "formula approach" which it adopted 45
years ago6 4 has no application in determining fair market values of cor-
porate stocks or business interests unless it was imperative to value in-
tangible assets of the corporation or intangible assets included in the
57. 43 TC 663.
58. 44 TC-#75.
59. TC Memo.-1965-99.
60. "Auction Sales Price of Property", Note, 23 Journal of Taxation 284 (1965);
Note 51 Cornell L.Q. 613 (1966).
61. CB 1965-1, 155.
62. Rev. Rul. 65-40, CB 1965-1, 429; Rev. Rul. 65-83, CB 1965-1, 430; and
Rev. Rul. 65-91, CB 1965-1, 431.
63. CB 1965-2.
64. ARM 34, CB 2, 31 (1920); ARM 68, CB 3, 43 (1920).
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business interest. The ruling also extends the principles set forth in Rev.
Rul. 59-6065 for valuing closely held corporate stock for estate and gift
tax purposes to income tax controversies. In so doing Rev. Rul. 65-192
may go a long way to harmonize what could be divergent and confusing
criteria depending upon the tax involved.
An acquiescence by the Commissioner to an adverse decision of the Tax
Court is a curious administrative phenomenon. 6 In Rev. Rul. 65-259"
the Commissioner withdrew his acquiescence issued 21 years earlier in
Minnesota Mortuaries.8 Henceforth, rental income derived from a cor-
porate lessee, anyone of whose shareholders (directly or indirectly) owns
one-fourth or more in value of the stock of the lessor corporation, will
be treated as income from the use of corporation property described in
Section 543 (a) (6) of the Code for personal holding company purposes.
To protect taxpayers who relied on the acquiescence, Rev. Rul. 259 will
be applied only to taxable years beginning July 1, 1965 and thereafter.6
SPECIAL PROBLEMS
Unreasonable Accumulations of Surplus 70
In 1965 there was much litigation activity in this area, presumably be-
cause of the increased activity of the Service in asserting Section 531 li-
ability. As usual the Commissioner has been sustained more often 71 than
65. CB 1959-1, 237.
66. See Rogovin, "The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retro-
activity", 43 TAXES 756. The Commissioner does not "acquiesce" or "non-
acquiesce" to any decision of a District Court, Court of Appeals, Court of Claims,
or Supreme Court. The practice of acquiescence or non-acquiescence started
when the Board of Tax Appeals was created in 1924.
67. CB 1965-2.
68. 4 TC 280 (1944). The withdrawal was occasioned belatedly by 320 East
47th Street Corp. v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1957) 243 (2d) 894.
69. The question arises: if in 1957 the Court of Appeals correctly held such
rental income to be income from use of corporate property, are not some taxpayers
being given an exceptional "break" for the years 1957 to 1965 ?
70. See generally Nelson, "Recent Trends Regarding Unreasonable Accumula-
tions of Surplus", 43 TAXES 857 (1965).
71. See, e.g., Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc. v. United States (D.C. Fla., 1965) 244
F. Supp. 380; Fenco, Inc. v. Uuited States (CA 4, 1965) 348 F. (2d) 456; Young
Motor Co., Inc. v. Commissioner (CA 1, 1965) 339 F. (2d) 481; United States v.
McNally Pittsburgh Mfg. Corp. (CA 10, 1965) 342 F. (2d) 198; Carlen Realty
Co. v. Tomlinson (CA 5, 1965) 345 F. (2d) 998; Havens & Martin v. United
States (D.C. Va., 1965) 15 AFTR (2d) 1140, 65-1 USTC par. 9417; Dickman
Lumber Company v. United States (D.C. Wash.) 15 AFTR (2d) 027, 65-1 USTC
par. 9133; Ted Bates, Inc. TCM 1965-251; Perfection Foods, Inc., TCM 1965-15;
Bardahl Mfg. Corp., TCM 1965-200; Otmar Realty Estate Corp., TCM 1965-189;
Charles Turner, TCM 1965-101, Sears Oil Co., TCM 1965-39; Apollo Industries,
Inc., 44 TC 1; Goodall Estate, TCM 1965-154.
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not 72 because of the generality and vagueness in the reasons and justifica-
tion given by many taxpayers for not distributing dividends. Thus, tax-
payers generally fail in their proof of the reasonableness of their needs.
In Viona-Lione7" the Tax Court stated that where the accumulation
is not unreasonable the burden is still on the corporation to establish that
there was no avoidance of income tax on shareholders but such fact "is
repugnant to the existence of a purpose to avoid tax and, although not
conclusive, is substantial evidence that such a purpose did not exist".
Yet in Scripps Newspapers74 where the accumulated earnings were not
unreasonable there was no need to determine whether the corporation
was "availed of" to avoid tax on shareholders because of the credit under
Section 535 (c) (1). And in Bremerton Sun Publishing Co. 75 where there
was an unreasonable accumulation there was proof that the corporation
was not availed of to avoid tax. 76
Net Operating Loss Carryovers77
Net operating loss carryovers were considered in several decisions and
in a statement of policy by the Internal Revenue Service. In three de-
cisions involving pre-1954 losses the taxpayers were unsuccessful. In Allied
Central Stores78 the taxpayer was a constituent corporation in a pre-June
22, 1954 merger. It was denied a carryover of pre-merger losses (even
though the merger occurred in a fiscal year ended January 31, 1954) to
post-merger 1955 and 1957 income. In Fawick Corporation"9 and Fore-
most Dairies"' taxpayers were denied carryover losses under the 1939
Code because the losses were being offset against a business activity dif-
ferent from that which gave rise to the loss."' In H. F. Ramsey8 2 the Tax
Court held that a change in ownership did not preclude a carryover of
loss under Section 382 of the 1954 Code but applied Section 269 of the
72. See, e.g., Viona-Lione, Inc., TCM 1965-96; Bremerton Sun Publishing Co.,
44 TC 566; Carolina Rubber Hose Corp., TCM 1965-229; Donruss Co. v. United
States (D.C. Tenn., 1965) 15 AFTR (2d) 896, 65-1 USTC par. 9292; Scripps
Newspapers, 44 TC 453; Freedom Newspapers, TCM 1965-248; Oman Construc-
tion Co., TCM 1965-325.
73. TCM 1965-96.
74. 44 TC 453.
75. 44 TC 566.
76. Contra, Bardahl Mfg. Corp., supra, Charles Turner, supra.
77. See Wimmer, "Operating Loss Carryovers: Recent Developments", 43
TAXES 869 (1965).
78. Allied Central Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner (CA 2, 1965) 339 F. (2d) 503.
79. Fawick Corporation v. Commissioner (CA 6, 1965) 342 F. (2d) 823.
80. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner (CA 5, 1965) 341 F. (2d) 580.
81. Libson Shops v. Koehler, 353 US 382 (1957).
82. H. F. Ramsey, Inc., 43 TC 500.
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1954 Code to bar the deduction because there was a patent purpose to
avoid tax by the shift of control.
The decision which has created a stir is Maxwell Hardware.8s Tax-
payer corporation suffered substantial losses in the hardware business. It
entered into an arrangement with two partners (engaged in the real
estate business) to develop a sub-division. Thereafter the hardware busi-
ness was discontinued. The partners furnished funds through the pur-
chase of nonvoting preferred stock equivalent to 40% of the value of the
common stock. Reversing the Tax Court8 4 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit permitted the hardware losses to be offset against the
profits of the subdivision activity. The Court held that Sections 269, 482,
and 382 (a) of the 1954 Code were not bars to the allowance. And in an
unequivocal statement the Court said "Libson Shops, decided under the
1939 Act, is no longer law. It has been superseded by the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code which, in Section 382, dealt specifically and differently
with the concept of continuity of business enterprise upon which the
Libson Shops decision was based."
How does the Internal Revenue Service react to the Maxwell Hard-
ware decision? On October 13, 1965, the Service replied8 5 in part as
follows:
"It is the position of the Revenue Service that in cases similar to
Maxwell Hardware, Sections 269 and 382, as well as Section 482,
are applicable in dealing with the carryover of losses. The Revenue
Service believes that the foregoing statutory provisions must be con-
strued to effectuate congressional intent in combating 'trafficking in
loss carryovers'. Moreover, the Service also believes that the loss
carryover in cases similar to Maxwell Hardware should be denied
under the rationale of the Libson Shops decision since to permit a
loss carryover in such cases would run counter to the legislative ob-
jectives of the carryover privilege.
"The cornerstone of the Libson Shops decision was a searching
examination of the purposes of the carryover privilege * * * this
* ** analysis was not made obsolete by the enactment in 1954 of
provisions limiting or denying loss carryovers in certain situations
involving abuses that were specifically brought to the attention of
Congress. It is the view of the Service that the basic approach of
83. Maxwell Hardware Company v. Commissioner (CA 9, 1965) 343 F. (2d)
713. For a trenchant critique, see Comment, "The Loss Carryover Deduction and
Changes in Corporate Structure", 66 Col. L.R. 338 (1966).
84. 41 TC 386.
85. TIR 773, 657 CCH Std. Fed. Tax Reports par. 675.
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the Supreme Court in Libson Shops retains vitality under the 1954
Code in interpreting the application of Section 172." 8
The Revenue Service thus appears to be "fighting mad" about the
Maxwell Hardware decision and bids fair to continue to maintain the
vitality of Libson Shops for some time to come.
87
86. The release also announced that the Service would "apply Libson Shops in
any loss carryover case under the 1954 Code, not contemplated by the anouncement
in Revenue Ruling 58-603, CB 1958-2, 147, where there has been both a 50 per-
cent or more shift in the benefits of a loss carryover (whether direct or indirect and
including transactions having the effect of shifting the benefit of the loss by shift-
ing assets, stock, profit interests or other valuable rights) and a change in business
as defined in section 382(a) and the regulations thereunder. The Service will not
rely on Libson Shops under the 1954 Code in any loss carryover case where there
has been less than a 50 percent change in the beneficial ownership of the loss or
where there has been no change in business as defined in section 382(a) and the
regulations thereunder. However, the Service will continue to rely on sections 269
and 482, where appropriate, in dealing with the carryover of losses. Revenue Ruling
63-40, C. B. 1963-1, 46 will be modified to the extent inconsistent herewith.
"The Revenue Service stated that certiorari was not requested in Maxwell Hard-
ware due to the absence of a direct conflict between the circuits. The decision will
not be followed as a precedent in the disposition of similar cases."
87. Scheff, Comment on TIR 773, 23 Journal of Taxation 326 (1965).
